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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
W. B. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THEOGDENUNIONRAILWAY AND 
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8603 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is a suit brought by the plaintiff for breach of 
an employment contract, praying for damages at the time 
of trial in the sum of $40,000.00. This is the second appeal, 
the opinion of this court being found in 247 P. (2d) at page 
257, decided August 6, 1952, but not yet printed in the Utah 
Reports. We do not agree with appellant's statement of the 
facts, for a number of reasons other than that the state-, 
ment is incorrect and incomplete. 
Note: To complete the record we found it necessary to obtain an order of the 
lower court pursuant to Rule 75 (h) for the transmission to this court of a supple-
mental record, containing the verdict of the jury showing their special findings and 
a second supplemental record containing the second amended complaint and defendant's 
answer thereto, which pleadings formed the basis for the pre-trial order and defined 
the issues litigated in the court below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
rrhe plaintiff was employed by defendant through the 
war years, frorn August of 1941 to August 3, 1945. I-Iis 
employment was governed, in part, by a carrier union col-
lective bargaining agreement covering the wages, hours and 
working conditions of "yardmen" employed by defendant 
in its yard at Ogden. The parties thereto, the signatories, 
were respondent herein and the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen, bargaining agent for the employees : 
So far as material the contract provided: 
"55(b). LEAVE OF ABSENCE: Yardmen 
taking leave of absence for a period of over ten days 
must secure and fill out Form 153 so the leave will 
he covered as a rna tter of record." 
"ARTICLE VIII.-INVESTIGATIONS 
"38. Investigations: No yardman will be sus-
pended or dismissed without first having a fair and 
impartial hearing and his guilt established. The 
man whose case is under consideration may be rep-
resented by an employe of his choice, who may be 
a committeeman, who will be permitted to interro-
gate witnesses. The accused and his representative 
shall be permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses. 
Charges will be investigated within 5 days and the 
result of the infestigation will be made known within 
3 days. In fixing hours at which investigation shall 
be held, due consideration of the need of rest by 
yardmen will be given by the company's officials. A 
yardman shall be entitled to an investigation before 
his record is assessed with demerits. In case dis-
missal is found to be unjust, yardman shall be rein-
stated and paid for all tin1e lost, provided objection 
has been filed with Superintendent in writing not 
later than thirty days from date of dismissal; other-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
wise pay for time lost will commence ten days after 
date of letter of objection" (Pl. Ex. E). 
July 4, 1945, plaintiff Russell burned his leg with some 
steam while on the job. He did not work the following five 
days but was released to return to work by Dr. Keith L. 
Stratford, company doctor, July 11, 1945. He didn't report 
for work until July 19. He then worked only two days-
the 19th and 20th of July, 1945 (Tr. 123-124). Dr. Strat-
ford, after Russell had been discharged and was seeking 
reinstatement advised the company that Russell was, in his 
opinion, able to work after July 11, 1945 (Def. Ex. 6). Dr. 
Stratford knew when he wrote that letter, that the com-
pany was inquiring a.s to whether or not Russell was unable 
to work after July 20, 1945 (Def. Ex. 5). Dr. Stratford also 
testified at the trial that Russell was able to work after 
July 11, 1945 even though Russell had called at his office 
July 27 and was given some drops for his ear. After work-
ing July 19 and 20 only, Russell left the job. After the 
lapse of more than ten days during which nothing was heard 
from him, Russell was. notified to appear before Assistant 
Superintendent Caulk, now dead, for an investigation on 
account of being absent in excess of ten days without writ-
ten leave in violation of Rule 55 (b) of the contract. He 
requested and received a continuance and the investigation 
was held August 3, 1945. The hearing was. stenographically 
reported and transcribed and is in evidence (Pl. Ex. A). 
The plaintiff Russell was present in person and represented 
by the local chairman of his union, J. B. Hudgens. No com-
plaint was made then nor throughout the long course of his 
litigation that the plaintiff was not given proper notice of 
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the hearing, or allowed to testify in his own behalf or 
produce any witnesses he chose or was denied the right to 
a representative of his own choice. The hearing was 
continued to a day of his own choosing, he was present with 
a representative of his own choosing. We mention this here 
because the only issue plaintiff has made in this case has 
been that the plaintiff was not guilty of violating Rule 
55 (b) relating to absence, under such circumstances as 
justified his dismissal. Now, and for the first time Mr. 
Patterson, counsel for Russell, endeavors to claim in his 
brief that Russell was deprived of the foregoing procedural 
rights. 
The transcript of the hearing (Pl. Ex. A) reveals: 1. 
That plaintiff knew that written leave was required for an 
absence in excess of ten days. 2. That he did not secure 
written leave. 3. That he never at any time communicated 
with the company, requested any leave or advised them 
in any way of any reason for his absence. His excuse for 
his absence which he gave for the first time at the hearing 
was that he was "sick in bed." 
He was interrogated as follows by Assistant Super-
intendent Caulk: 
"Q. I understand you own a club up the can-
yon. 
"A. I don't. 
"Q. You work up there don't you? 
"A. Yes." 
Since discipline, was assessed Russell had a right to a 
copy of the transcript and was supposed to sign it. After 
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the testimony was transcribed, he called at the office of the 
Assistant Superintendent and secured the transcript -
changing the answer "Yes" and having it read "No" before 
he signed. 
Russell received notice from Mr. Caulk on August 4, 
1945, that he was discharged for being absent without writ-
ten leave for a period of ten days (Tr. 61). He had six 
months thereafter within which to appeal. Five and one-
half months thereafter, on January 14 he did appeal through 
the local chairman of his union to Mr. R. E. Edens, Super-
intendent of the respondent company. Mr. R. E. Edens, also 
now dead, declined to reinstate him and so advised his local 
chairman by letter of January 22, 1946 (Pl. Ex. C). 
The next and. final step required of Russell in handling 
his grievance with the company was to appeal his dismissal 
to the highest supervising officer of the company who was 
Mr. F. C. Paulsen, operating Vice President of the defen-
dant company and General Manager of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company (Tr. 152). This final appeal he took, 
being represented by Mr. C. E. McDaniels, acting Vice 
President of the Switchmen's Union of North America. 
He authorized McDaniels in writing as an officer of the 
SUN A, to prosecute and progress his grievance claim, to 
act as his agent and representative in his place and stead 
and authorized McDaniels to "negotiate, adjust and dispose 
of" the grievance "in any manner" (Def. Ex. I). McDan-
iels proceeded to handle Russell's claim and after some cor-
respondence a conference was arranged in the office of 
Mr. Paulsen in Salt Lake City between Mr. Paulsen and 
Mr. McDaniels. This conference took place May 7, 1946, 
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Mr. McDaniels and Mr. Pausen being the only ones present 
(Tr. 159). There was but the one conference (Tr. 159). 
1\tlr. Paulsen and Mr. McDaniels reviewed the investigation 
(Tr. 160) and Mr Paulsen told McDaniels that Russell had 
falsified at the investigation (Tr. 161). Mr. McDaniels 
told Paulsen that if Russell falsified at the investigation 
"we don't condone it" (Tr. 161). McDaniels asked for an 
opportunity to investigate the charge Mr. Paulsen had made, 
stating that if the accusation was correct he would advise 
Paulsen thereof, but that he wanted "to be sure that I'm 
right" and "I'll not go along with a man that will not tell 
the truth" (Tr. 160-161-162). The conference closed on this 
note. No further conferences were held and Mr. Paulsen 
heard no more from either McDaniels, or Russell or anyone 
else on Russell's behalf, (Tr. 162) except through a letter 
dated May '14, 1946, written by Mr. McDaniels and ad-
dressed to Mr. Paulsen (Def. Ex. 13). McDaniels in this 
letter referred to the conference held May 7, and specifi-
cally to the charge n1ade that Russell had falsified, advised 
Paulsen that he had completed his investigation and "we 
are withdrawing the grievance and the case is closed." Mr. 
Paulsen upon receipt of McDaniel's letter of ~lay 14 closed 
his files on the case, and thereafter treated the matter as 
a Hdead issue" and heard no more of the matter until 
Russell filed this suit for unlawful discharge in May of 
1949, three years later (Tr. 165). 
The issues of fact, and there \vere no questions of law, 
tried out in the court below were set out in the pretrial 
order (R. 12). We invite the court's attention thereto. In 
view of the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant the 
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matter of damages is, of course, out of the case. The pre-
trial order recites that the "issues of law and fact as fixed 
by the court" so far as the plaintiff's case is concerned are 
"1. Did the plaintiff fail to perform his contract of em-
ployment in that he violated Rule 55 (b) of the contract of 
employment." So far as the defendant was concerned the 
pre-trial order stated defendant's position as follows: 
"1. That the plaintiff's discharge was in compliance 
with and in conformity with the applicable provisions of 
the contract. 
"2. That the defendant was justified in dismissing 
the plaintiff from his employment for violation of Rule 
55 (b). 
"3. That plaintiff's action is barred for the reason 
that the claimed grievance of the plaintiff was settled and 
disposed of by mutual agreement between the plaintiff and 
the defendant and in accordance with the provisions of the 
contract and the National Railway Labor Act." 
It should be clear that counsel on both sides and the 
court were adhering strictly to the holding of this court 
in its former decision. Simply stated the·re were but two 
things litigated: viz., 1. Was the defendant justified in 
dismissing the plaintiff? 2. Did the parties settle and dis-
pose of the controversy by mutual agreement? 
In the former opinion 247 P. (2d) 257, Mr. Justice 
1\icDonough said at page 260 : 
"However, upon proof of the contract of em-
ployment such as that herein involved, the employee 
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established a prima facie case by proving such con-
tract, his performance thereof up to the tirae of 
discharge, and damages (citing authority). The 
burden of proving justification for the discharge 
then falls upon the defendant." 
We were entitled as Mr. Justice McDonough said at 
page 261 to "present any legal or equitable defense avail-
able to overcome such prima facie case." In other words 
it was for the jury to decide whether or not cause for dis-
charge existed. 
The· court submitted the following special interroga-
tories to the jury : 
"1. Did the Depot Company in fact breach the con-
tract by not complying with Article VIII, Rule 38 as 
claimed?" Answer : "No." 
"2. Was Mr. Russell in fact guilty of violating Arti-
cle XIII Rule 55 (b) by being absent from work from about 
July 20 to July 31, 1945 ?" Answer: "Yes." (See Supp. 
Record.) 
In addition the jury returned a general verdict, which 
was unanimous (Tr. 261) in favor of defendant and against 
plaintiff of "no cause of Action." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
VIOLATION OF RULE 55(b) DOES CONSTI-
TUTE GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE. 
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POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT DID ACCORD THE PLAIN-
TIFF· HIS RIGHTS UNDER RULE 38. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT NEVER OFFERED ANY 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE OR CLAIMED IN 
"ORAL ARGUMENT" Tf.Ii\.T PLAINTIFF vVAS 
DISCIIARGED FOR ANY REASON OTHER 
THAN VIOLATION OF RULE 55(b). 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS OR IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE IN-
STRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY P·LAINTIFF. 
POINT V. 
THIS CASE WAS SETTLED AND DISPOSED 
OF B.Y MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
VIOLATION OF R-ULE 55(b) DOES CONSTI-
TUTE GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE. 
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We admitted in our first brief, have always admitted 
and admit now that if it was impossible for an employee 
to comply with the rule. discharge would not be justified. 
In the former opinion Mr. Justice McDonough said at p. 
262: 
''* * * it is practically conceded in the brief 
of the defendant that if the plaintiff was in fact 
unable, because of illness, to comply with Article 
VIII, Rule 55 (b), the defendant would not have as-
sessed the discipline that it did." 
Moreover we agree entirely with Mr. Justice Crockett in 
his separate concurring opinion that the company must not 
act "arbitrarily or in bad faith" in connection with any 
phase of the hearing or in the assessment of discipline. We 
agree with Justice Crockett at page 263 where he rejects 
any idea that after notice and hearing by the company "it 
is entirely up to their representative to make the deter-
mination regardless of how abritrary it is." May we say 
we never intended to give any such impression. 
Plaintiff lifts out of context and quotes in his brief a 
portion of the testimony of the witness, H. C. Beckett, an 
e·mployee, who was local chairman of the bargaining agent 
union from 1923 to 1953-a period of thirty years, and who 
signed the contract that is here involved on behalf of the 
employees-in an effort to show the parties did not consider 
violation of Rule 55 (b) a ground for discharge. His testi-
mony as a whole (Tr. 124-139) clearly shows the contrary . 
..c'\.fter calling the 'vitness Beckett's attention to the fact 
that no penalty was provided in the rule itself Mr. Patter-
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son further interrogated the witness on cross examination 
as follows: 
Mr. Patterson: "Q. In other words, it was 
mandatory to drop him from the service?" 
Mr. Beckett: "A. There is plenty. There is a 
record down there, I guess hundreds of them who 
were dropped from the rolls because they were ab-
sent without proper leaves. 
"Q. Mr. Edens testified yesterday sometimes 
they dropped them and sometimes they didn't. Would 
you say Mr. Edens is wrong? 
"A. I would say the records down there, hun-
dreds of men were dropped from the rolls during 
my period of time. 
"Q. Mr. Beckett, can't you answer yes, or no? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. Well, I asked you one. Would you say Mr. 
Edens was wrong when he said sometimes they 
didn't and sometimes they did? 
"A. Well, I don't know what Mr. Edens had in 
his mind. I couldn't explain that. 
"Q. All right. And you don't know whether 
Mr. Edens was right or wrong. 
"A. I can't tell you what Mr. Edens had in 
mind when he made that statement, but I know that 
Mr. Edens and myself closed out many records be-
cause of the fact the man didn't protect himself by 
a leave of absence. 
"Q. When he was sick in bed? 
"A. Well, if he was sick in bed we usually 
provided for that. 
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"Q. \Vhat do you mean you usually provided 
for that, 
"A. Well, if we found that a man was sick 
in bed or was injured and so forth, that he was 
more or less granted a leave· of absence when it was 
a bona fide fact that such was the case" (Tr. 131-
132). (Italics ours.) 
Beckett was uncontradicted, and it thus appears that 
violation of Rule 55 (b) was customarily regarded by the 
parties as a grounds of discharge, it further appearing 
that it was not administered arbitrarily or in bad faith 
(Tr. 132-133). 
In the case of Ward vs. American Linen Supply, ( ... 
Ut .... ) 307 P. (2d) 210, decided by this court as recently as 
February 8, 1957, Mr. Justice Wade refers to the conunon 
law rule that gave the employer the right to discharge for 
any cause without incurring liability. We realize this case 
dealt with a rather narrow issue and that under the contract 
now before the court no employee can be discharged for any 
cause without first receiving a fair and impartial hearing. 
But the "causes" for discharge are not set out. 'Ve can 
discharge for any cause. 
But the real reason that this Point I should be sum-
marily resolved against the plaintiff is that here-in plain-
tiff's brief, for the first time in this seemingly endless liti-
gation, the point is raised. At no time in the pleadings, 
stipulations or pre-trial order, or in any other place or man-
ner was this point ever placed in issue, nor was it litigated 
at the trial. The lower court never passed on the question, 
which if it had been present, would have been a question 
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of law. We do not see how this court can notice a point such 
as this, raised for the first time in a brief on appeal. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT DID ACCORD THE PLAIN-
TIFF HIS RIGHTS UNDER RULE 38. 
What were his rights. under Rule 38? He was entitled 
among other things to a fair and impartial hearing on the 
charge made against him. The jury in answer to the special 
interrogatory "Did the Depot Company in fact break the 
contract by not complying with Article VIII, Rule 38" an-
swered "No." Apparently what plaintiff's counsel intends 
to say here is that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
the jury in finding that the plaintiff was accorded his rights 
under Rule 38. But he points to nothing whatever, as evi-
dence that the investigation was not conducted openly and 
fairly, or suggests that it was conducted arbitrarily and in 
bad faith. To be sure, the transcript does not reflect the 
skill, learning and artistry to be expected of a hearing 
conducted by lawyers or men engaged in presiding at ad-
ministrative hearings. Mr. Caulk was a railroader-no 
more adept in this medium than Russell or his representa-
tive Hudgens, local chairman of the Union, or than rail-
roaders generally are in this situation. These investigations 
always leave much to be desired from the critical stand-
point of a lawyer. But Russell had notice, he asked and 
was granted a continuance, he was present in person, given 
a chance to explain his absence, he was represented by Mr. 
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Hudgens, the local chairman, he had a right to call any 
witnesses he desired. He produced no witnesses in his 
behalf, yet Russell knew when he went to that hearing on 
August 3, 1945, that his job was in the balance. Plaintiff's 
counsel calls our attention to nothing in the evidence indi-
cating he was not given all these procedural rights. 
Whatever the evidence or lack thereof may have been 
at the investigation when Russell elected to sue in the courts 
for a breach of contract, it became the duty of the court 
(the jury in this instance) to decide on the basis of the evi-
dence produced at the trial the same as in any other suit 
for breach of contract, whether there had been a breach. 
Russell vs. OUR&D, supra. And all evidence as Justice 
McDonough said, that was competent and relevant, whether 
legal or equitable was admissible on the question of whether 
or not the contract had been breached by defendant. If the 
former opinion makes anything clear, it is that the jury 
were the ones to decide whether Russell was guilty of the 
charge that led to his dismissal. It is well worth quoting. 
At page 261, it is said: 
"At this point, we refer briefly to a contention 
of the plaintiff. He contends that since Rule 38, 
Art. 8 of the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vides that 'no yardman will be suspended or dis-
missed without first having a fair and impartial 
hearing and his guilt established,' the correct con-
struction of such rule requires that the evidence 
taken before the investigating officer must clearly 
reveal the yardman's guilt. For several reasons we 
think that this contention is without merit." 
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After a discussion of some other facets of the problem, Mr. 
Justice McDonough concluded this portion of the opinion 
by saying: 
"We here reiterate that he is here seeking re-
dress in the courts for an unjust discharge. The 
court as the trier of the fact must determine whether 
or not his guilt was in fact established." (Italics 
added.) 
And that was the process followed in the trial below, the 
question being submitted to the jury on all the evidence in 
the case. 
If this Point II of plaintiff means that the evidence at 
the trial was insufficient to support a finding that Russell 
was guilty of a violation of Rule 38 under such circum-
stances as warranted his dismissal (and we cannot imagine 
what else counsel could mean by it), it would seem that 
plaintiff would discuss. the evidence in an effort to show 
its insufficiency. Except for a brief discussion of the evi-
dence of Dr. Keith Stratford, the company physician, plain-
tiff's attorney does not point out wherein the evidence was 
"wholly insufficient" to support the verdict. 
Instead, he appears to contend that some "Federal 
Rule" is involved. He advises us that cases in State Courts 
under the Federal Employers Liability Act are governed 
by the federal concept of negligence and federal decisions. 
That of course is well known. He cites Urie vs. Thompson, 
337 U. S. 163; 93 L. Ed. 1282, wherein the Supreme Court 
held that an employee in interstate commerce by rail might 
recover damages for occupational disease, in this instance 
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"silicosis," which it was contended resulted from the use 
of sanders on locomotives. 
Jester vs. Southern Ry. Co., 29 SE (2d) 768, is an 
FELA case where an engineer shot and killed his fireman 
for not obeying orders. Plaintiff says the same requirement 
to follow Federal decisions in FELA cases is also mandatory 
in contract cases; citing Transcontinental and Western Air, 
Inc., vs. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653; 97 L. Ed. 1325. Koppal 
holds the very opposite, to wit: that in suits for breach of 
a union carrier agreement in a State Court substantive 
and procedural laws of the State govern. Koppal brought 
suit in the Federal Court in Missouri, an action under 
Missouri law, for wrongful discharge. As the court knows, 
collective agreements of air lines, are governed by the Rail-
way Labor Act. Missouri State Law requires the exhaus-
tion of the administrative remedies in all contracts as a 
condition precedent to maintaining action in court. The 
Supreme Court of the United States held that Koppal could 
not maintain his action in the Federal District Court of 
Missouri until he had shown that he had brought himself 
within the re·quirements of the Missouri State Law even 
though the contract involved was entered into pursuant to 
the Railway Labor Act. It is thus clear that the Supreme 
Court of the United States has said actions for breach of a 
contract of employment, contracts entered into under the 
Railway Labor Act, shall proceed according to State La,vs, 
substantive and procedural, the exact opposite of plaintiff's 
contention. We say again this case is nothing but a simple 
"garden variety" type of action for breach of contract under 
Utah law. The former decision of this court so held, and 
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the Supreme Court of the United States so holds in the 
Koppal case. 
The only piece of evidence plaintiff refers to is the 
testimony of Dr. Stratford and two letters which he wrote 
in connection with this case. We think that a brief refer-
ence by us to all of the evidence including that of Dr. Strat-
ford is called for under this point. If the Court will be 
kind enough to indulge us briefly, we think such a review 
of the evidence will also dispose of the next point in plain-
tiff's brief (Point III) with very little additional comment. 
The plaintiff in his brief says that all that can be, a.c-
corded Dr. Stratford's testimony and his letter of April 
30, 1946 is that Russell was able to work on July 11, 1945, 
and that we torture the evidence by claiming the evidence 
of Dr. Stratford related as well, to the period Russell was 
absent without leave. However, while Russell was. seeking 
reinstatement and on April 27, 1946, Superintendent R. E. 
Edens wrote to Dr. Stratford (Def. Ex. 5) and in that 
letter, among other things, said: "Mr. Russell was. dismissed 
for being absent without proper leave of absence and he is 
endeavoring to secure reinstatement with pay for time lost 
on the basis that his absence was due to illness." * * * 
"Shall appreciate it if you will check your records further 
and advise whether or not you consider the earache was of 
such nature as to cause him to be incapacitated from work 
from July 27 to August 6." The doctor was thus advised 
that Russell had been dismissed for being absent without 
proper leave, was claiming that his absence was due to ill-
ness and that he was being asked specifically as to whether 
the earache was of such a nature as to cause Russell to be 
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incapacitated from work. On April 30, 1946, three days 
after the foregoing letter was written, Dr. Stratford wrote 
Mr. Edens as follows: "In checking our files on William 
B. Russell, former switchman, I found all the dates correct. 
Mr. Russe11 complained of very much pain during the visits 
(visits for the burn on his leg as well as the earache-see 
Edens' letter Def. Ex. 5) to our office. I believe he was 
capable of working after his release on July 11, 1945 (Def. 
Ey. 6). lVloreover, Dr. Stratford testified as follows at the 
trial. 
Questions by Mr. Bronson calling his attention to Ex-
hibit 6. 
"Q. You say here, 'I believe he was capable of 
working after his release on July 11, 1945,' is that 
correct? 
"A. That's correct. 
"Q. And was that your opinion at the time 
when you wrote it? 
"A. That was my opinion at that time. 
"Q. Will you testify it is your opinion now? 
"A. Yes, sir." 
There is no question but that Russell called on Dr. 
Stratford on July 27 complaining of an earache and received 
some drops therefor. The plaintiff makes much of the fact 
that Dr. Stratford, a company physician, gave him a release 
for work on August 6. Russell obtained the release from 
Dr. Stratford by trick (there is no other word for it) in 
order to bolster his claim that he was sick and under the 
care of a doctor during the period of time which was the 
subject of the investigation. Russell testified that he re-
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ceived notice of his discharge August 4 (Tr. 61). He also 
admitted that thereafter (after he was discharged) and 
on August 6 he went to Dr. Stratford's office, requested and 
received, a release to return to work (Tr. 61). He also testi-
fied that he did not tell Dr. Stratford when he got there-
lease that he had been discharged (Tr. 64). He also ad-
mitted that he never turned this release into the company, 
which ordinarily v1ould be the only purpose for obtaining 
it, (Tr. 64) but that he retained it and gav~e it to his counsel, 
Mr. Patterson (Tr. 63). Dr. Stratford testified that he did 
not know at the time he gave Russell the release to return 
to work that he had been discharged (Tr. 147). 
Both Russell and his wife, Margaret, were subpoenaed 
by the defendant to appear as witnesses at the trial. Russell 
testified that the Pine View Inn was leased in December 
1944 "by his wife." Russell took out a beer license from 
Weber County for the Pine View Inn, the application being 
d'ated May 10, 1945 and signed "Mrs. Margaret Russell by 
W. B. Russell" (Def. Ex. 2). This signature was in the 
plaintiff's handwriting (Tr. 73), and the application re-
cited as follows : "The names, ages and addresses of all 
persons directly or indirectly connected with said business 
for which license is hereby applied for are Mrs Margaret 
Russell, legal age, and W. B. Russell, legal age." He testi-
fied this license cost $200.00 and that the lease rental on 
the Pine View Inn was $150.00 to $175.00 per month (Tr. 
74). That it was also necessary to stock the establishment 
with supplies, that both bottled and draught beer was. sold 
and the dining room specialized in steaks, chicken and trout 
dinners (Tr. 80). They also sold various sundry items. All 
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of the r.aoney to start this business Russell said he loaned 
to his wife, Margaret (Tr. 76). Mrs. Margaret Russell also 
testified that Russell loaned her the money to get the busi-
ness started (Tr. 91). Russell testified that as between 
him and his wife he took no note, made no memorandum, 
or record of the transaction that it was, as he said, "all in 
the family" (Tr. 76). Apparently the Pine View Inn was 
a fairly substantial "set-up." According to testimony of 
Mrs. Margaret Russell, they served bottled and draught 
beer at a bar where twenty or thirty men could stand at 
one time (Tr. 95), they had seven or eight tables in the 
dining room where they served principally trout, steak and 
chicken dinners (Tr. 95). The Ogden area was swarming 
with military personnel in the summer of 1945 (Tr. 79-80). 
They \Vere able to sell all the beer, steaks, etc. that could 
be obtained ( Tr. 80) , there being a shortage of such items. 
Mrs. Russell testified that in July and August they were 
"as busy as they could be," that she didn't know how much 
they took in each month as Mr. Russell kept the books, but 
that it was at least $1,000.00 a month "maybe more" (Tr. 
95). That July 24, Pioneer Day, (which was during the 
period of Russell's absence from work), was a big business 
day. Mr. Russell testified that beer was hard to get at 
that time and one had to have contacts to get it (Tr. 79). 
Apparently, Russell had these contacts having worked as a 
bar tender for Combe, who owned the Marion Bar in Ogden, 
and from whom the Pine View Inn was leased. After his 
discharge, he was employed most of the time by beer dis-
tributing companies. 
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Mrs. Russell prior to the venture with the Pine View 
Inn had no business experience whatsoever according to 
her own testimony (Tr. 93). She testified that she had 
never before worked for anybody (Tr. 93) and that she 
had had no previous experience running a restaurant or 
bar (Tr. 93). It appears from the evidence that the Pine 
View Inn was usually opened sometime in the afternoon and 
kept open until 12, 1, or 2 o'clock in the morning. Russell, 
was working the 11 P.M. to 7 A.M. shift, which permitted 
him after he had obtained his rest to have· at least five or 
six hours· which could have been devoted to this business 
and of course Russell seldom worked for the defendant 
company, putting in only sixty two days in the first seven 
months of 1945. There were thus five months out of the 
first seven in 1945 that he could have devoted to the busi-
ness. 
The Russells lived in a house or cabin behind the Pine 
View Inn. Russell, himself, admitted that he sometimes 
cooked, that he sometimes tended bar and did other work 
about the Pine View Inn "to help his wife" (Tr. 78). Mrs. 
Russell had four little children, ages one to nine, to take 
care of in the summer of 1945, in addition to all her other 
duties of operating the Pine View Inn. Is it any wonder 
that the jury did not believe that Russell, seldom working 
at his job on the railroad, experienced in the beer business 
and having contacts that enabled him to get beer, would do 
nothing; while his wife, Margaret, who had never worked 
for anyone, who had no previous business experience what-
soever and had the care of four little children, operated this 
fairly substantial restaurant and bar business by herself? 
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Moreover, in addition to Russell admitting at the trial under 
oath that he did work to some extent around the Pine View 
Inn, Mrs. Russell testified : 
Questions by Mr. Bronson : 
"Q. And you had four little children at that 
time, ages one to nine to take care of, didn't you? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you ran this business yourself? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Your husband, did he help you? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And he was working up there? 
"A. He helped me as a husband" (Tr. 96). 
During the examination of Mr. Russell we referred to 
the transcript of the official investigation and asked him 
if the true answer to the question by Mr. Caulk, to wit, 
"You '\Vork up there don't you?" was not in fact "yes," 
which was the answer he had changed to "no" and he an-
swered * * * "Mr. Bronson, if you don't receive wages 
for anything there's no work" (Tr. 85). 
We submit that the foregoing testhnony out of the 
mouths of the plaintiff Russell and his wife was amply 
sufficient together with the other evidence to \Yarrant the 
jury in returning the verdict they did. A jury does not 
have to believe any witness--even though he is uncontra-
dicted if his testimony is inherently improbable either in 
an absolute sense, or in the light of other evidence in the 
case. 
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POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT NEVER OFFERED ANY 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE OR CLAIMED IN 
"ORAL ARGUMENT" THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
DISCHARGED FOR ANY REASON OTHER 
THAN VIOLATION OF RULE 55(b). 
The plaintiff says the evidence we produced shows 
plaintiff was discharged "at least in part" for reasons other 
than violation of Rule 55 (b). If the evidence was suffi-
cient to warrant the jury in finding plaintiff violated Rule 
55 (b) under circumstances warranting dismissal, that is 
enough; and if it shows something additional that certainly 
gives the plaintiff no grounds for complaint. We have never 
claimed and do not claim now that we have a right to justify 
Russell's discharge for any cause other than violation of 
Rule 55 (b). The evidence we detailed under Point II was 
competent and relevant as tending to show justification for 
the discharge and its probative value was for the jury. We 
see no need for further discussion of this point. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS OR IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE IN-
STRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff's attorney claims that the court's instructions 
do not comport with a "federal rule." The federal rule he 
refers to is the rule followed in cases tried under the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act as indicated earlier in this 
brief. Again, we say there is no "federal rule" whatever 
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in¥olved. Counsel says that the instructions are diamet-
rically opposed to the case of Transcontinental & Western 
Air, Inc., vs. Koppal, supra. As pointed out above, this case 
holds that state rules of procedure apply to suits for 
breaches of contracts entered into pursuant to the Railway 
Labor Act, the same as to any other suit in a state court for 
breach of contract. We are not going to repeat ourselves 
and refer to this matter again, although plaintiff's counsel 
belabors it throughout his discussion under Point IV. 
The plaintiff's exceptions to instruction given: The 
plaintiff excepted to paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 2 but 
gave no reasons. This the court might overlook but the 
plaintiff does not point out any error in the brief with 
respect thereto. We should not be required to defend an 
instruction of which the plaintiff has not offered a single 
word of criticism. 
The plaintiff excepted to the court's instruction Num-
ber 2, paragraph 3 (a). The court there instructed the jury: 
"However, if you find the above has been proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence you will award 
Mr. Russell damages in accordance with instructions 
that follow, unless you also find that the Railroad 
has proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
* * * that 
"(a) Mr. Russell was in fact guilty of viola-
tion of Rule 55(b) by being absent from July 20 to 
July 31 without proper leave under circumstances 
justifying his dismissal." 
This is unquestionably correct law and the court might 
well have stopped at this point. The court added paren-
thetically : 
"(In other words an employee cannot recover 
for being dismissed on a charge which is true, re-
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gardless of whether or not he was accorded. a proper 
investigation because the law presumes that had he 
been accorded a proper investigation he would have 
been dismissed any way. Under such a circumstance, 
the sufficiency of the investigation is immaterial.) " 
We will concede that it is doubtful that the court added 
anything to his instruction by the parenthetical explanation. 
We do not concede it was in error. Preceding the paren-
thetical explanation the court made a clear, concise and 
accurate statement of the law when he said the railroad 
had the burden of proof to show that Mr. Russell was in 
fact guilty of violation of Rule 55 (b), by being absent from 
July 20 to July 31, without proper leave, under circum-
stances justifying his dismissal. Moreover counsel in mak-
ing his objection did not advise the trial court of "the 
grounds of his objection" in this instance as required by 
Rule 51 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We are not un-
aware that the court in its discretion may disregard his 
failure to do so. Plaintiff contends that we conceded the 
error in this instruction. We suggested to the court that 
he elaborate, explain the matter further to the jury, so 
that it would not appear to be too favorable to the defen-
dant. The court stated "I believe it is covered in a later 
instruction." We concluded the matter was covered ade-
quately and accurately and did not refer to it again. There 
was a constant effort throughout this trial on the part of 
the plaintiff to implant in the minds of the jury, in the 
teeth of the former opinion of this court, that the transcript 
of the official investigation did not reveal the plaintiff's 
guilt and plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover. The 
court sought to make plain to the jury in the questioned 
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instruction that regardless of the evidence at the investiga-
tion, the jury was to decide the validity of the discharge 
upon all the evidence produced before them at the trial. 
The plaintiff complains of Instruction No. 3 because 
it tells the jury the railroad was required to comply with 
the provisions of Rule 38 requiring notice of the hearing, 
notice of the charge, according the plaintiff the right to 
appear in person, to be represented by someone of his own 
choice, etc. "unless these requirements were waived by the 
plaintiff." This is a correct statement and while there was 
no specific evidence that the plaintiff had waived these 
provisions, he did in fact waive part of them by not produc-
ing any witnesses and not taking the witness stand in his 
own behalf. There was no harm in the court making this 
explanation to the jury. 
Plaintiff complains that in instruction Number 3 the 
court erred further, in ''gratuitously'' injecting the que~tion 
of mistake into the case. Assuming it was not necessary 
to the determination of the two principal issues in the case, 
and that the trial court was acting "gratuitously" we sub-
mit it was harmless in view of the issues, the other instruc-
tions and the fndings of the jury on the special interroga-
tories. In no single particular does the plaintiff point out 
how this instruction could or did mislead the jury from a 
proper determination of the two issues involved, or how 
or in what manner it was prejudicial to the substantial 
rights of the plaintiff, preventing him from having a fair 
trial. The court was again telling the jury here, that apart 
from the claims of plaintiff concerning the official inves-
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tigation, they had to decide the issue on the evidence before 
them at the trial. 
The plaintiff complains principally of Instruction No. 
5, which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that the defendant had a 
right to dismiss any employee, including the plain-
tiff W. B. Russell, for violation of Rule 55 (b) of 
the contract which is in evidence, so long as the 
defendant was not acting in bad faith and arbitrarily 
and so long as the employee was physically able to 
comply with the provisions of said Rule 55 (b). And 
if you find that the plaintiff did violate said Rule 
55 (b) being physically able to comply therewith, 
and that the defendant was not acting in bad faith 
and arbitrarily when it dismissed him for such vio-
lation, your verdict should be in favor of the defen-
dant and against the plaintiff 'no cause of action.' " 
His complaint is that it places the burden of proof upon 
the plaintiff "to prove bad faith on the part of the defen-
dant and in addition to a physical impossibility on his part 
to perform." But he does not point out wherein or how this 
instruction places the burden on the plaintiff as claimed. 
The court clearly told the jury in its Instruction No. 2 that 
the burden 1vas upon the railroad to prove "Mr. Russell was 
in fact guilty of violation of Rule 55 (b) by being absent 
from July 20 to July 31 without proper leave under circum-
stances justifying his dismissal." The jury was therefore 
instructed that not only was the burden upon the defen-
dant to prove violation of Rule 55 (b) by a preponderance 
of the evidence, but that the defendant had the burden of 
negativing plaintiff's claim that it was physically impos-
sible for him to comply with the rule. The instructions also 
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placed on the defendant the burden of proving that it did 
not act arbitrarily or in bad faith which we think is estab-
lished if the evidence satisfies the jury that the plaintiff 
was not so incapacitated as to be unable to comply with the 
rule. We think the instruction is strictly in line with the 
former decision of this court and was. most favorable· to 
the plaintiff, giving him every advantage he was entitled 
to. This instruction was a correct, albeit an abstract state-
ment of the· law. It did not purport to deal with the burden 
of proof and of course must be read in the light of all the 
instructions. This court has many times said that the court 
cannot and need not cover the entire case in one instruc-
tion. The court told the jury in Instruction No. 15 that the 
instructions were "to be considered and construed as one 
connected \Vhole," and that the instructions were to be 
considered as a whole. The instructions as a whole clearly 
placed the burden of proving all elements set forth in In-
struction No. 5 squarely on defendant. 
Plaintiff's counsel next discusses errors in the instruc-
tions given by the court on damages and, since a verdict 
was returned in favor of the defendant, instructions on 
dan1ages, right or wrong, are moot, and we do not feel 
called upon to discuss them. The foregoing constitutes all 
of the exceptions taken to the instructions given by the 
court. 
Plaintiff's exceptions to the court's refusal to· grant 
requested instructio1tS: The plaintiff complains of the 
court's refusal to grant his requested Instruction Nos. 1 
to 12, inclusive, his exceptions mainly being that his re-
quests Hcorrectly set forth the la,v." 
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His Request No. 1 is palpably in error because it says 
in effect that the jury was required to find from the trans-
cript of the unsworn testimony at the investigation (all 
hearsay evidence) that the plaintiff's guilt was established, 
a question the jury, according to the former opinion of this 
court and the theory on which the case was tried, was re-
quired to determine from all the evidence produced before 
it at the trial. 
Plaintiff's Requests Nos. 2, 8 and 9 are concerned with 
damages and call for no comment. 
Plaintiff's Request No. 3 is subject to the same vice 
as· Request No. 1, as it tells the jury they must find that 
the defendant's guilt was proved at the hearing. 
Plaintiff's Request No. 4 clearly assumes that Russell 
was ill during the period of time which was the subject of 
the investigation and this was one of the two principal 
and disputed issues in the case. If it had not been, the 
plaintiff would have been entitled to a directed verdict, and 
it cannot be said that there was not a great deal of con-
flicting evidence thereon. 
Plaintiff's Request No. 6 tells the jury that Mr. Mc-
Daniels had no authority to bind Russell in his negotiations 
with Paulsen, which is palpably erroneous, and it goes so 
far as to instruct the jury to ignore the entire transaction 
and negotiations between Mr. Paulsen for the company 
and Mr. McDaniels, the personal representative of the plain-
tiff. It is actually a request for a directed verdict on this 
important issue. 
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 7 tells the jury that there 
can be no violation of the contract unless the evidence shows 
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that Russell intentionally and wilfully violated the contract. 
The plaintiff had no right to such an instruction under the 
contract of employment or otherwise. Nonetheless the bur-
den placed upon the defendant in the instructions required 
the defendant to prove that the defendant's absence was 
not due to the claimed cause, to wit, sickness, that k~pt him 
"right down in bed ;" and therefore this instruction was 
given in effect. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 10, while correct 
in the last sentence, is otherwise in error and seriously so. 
It tells the jury that the plaintiff does not need to prove 
his performance under the contract. The former decision 
of this court specifically holds that he must "prove his per-
formance (under the contract) up to the time of discharge" 
and we are quoting. 
Plaintiff's Request No. 11 again tells the jury that 
McDaniels as a matter of law, did not have authority to 
dispose of Russell's case with Mr. Paulsen, and is palpably 
erroneous. 
Plaintiff's Request No. 12 is substantially correct, and 
it was given in substance. It is nothing but a stock instruc-
tion. The requested n1atter was adequately covered. 
In the instructions that the court did give to the jury 
the law 'vas fully and accurately stated as it applied to 
the two issues involved in the case. Simply stated, these 
two issues were (1) was the defendant justified in dis-
charging the plaintiff and ( 2) did the parties settle and 
dispose of the controversy by mutual agreement. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
Even though there was error in the instructions given 
on that issue which dealt with the validity of the discharge, 
it does not control the disposition of this case. For the 
plaintiff assigns no error whatever in the court's instruc-
tions in submitting to the jury the issue as to whether the 
grievance had been settled and disposed of by mutual agree-
ment long before suit, nor does plaintiff claim the evidence 
on this issue was insufficient to support the verdict. 
We submit, on this issue alone, to which we now turn, 
the unanimous verdict of "no cause of action" disposes of 
the case and warrants affirmance of the judgment. 
POINT V. 
THIS CASE WAS SETTLED AND DISPOSED 
OF BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
The plaintiff has nothing whatsoever to say concern-
ing this issue in his brief, but because we think that stand-
ing by itself it is sufficient to warrant the verdict of "no 
cause of action" and to indicate to this court the proper 
disposition of this case, we feel it should be discussed sep-
arately. 'i'Te call the court's attention to the fact that all 
of the assignments of error in plaintiff's brief relate to 
the other issue in the case which involved the "validity of 
the discharge." No error at all is claimed in connection with 
the above issue either as to instructions given or the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the verdict thereon. The 
only error assigned in the brief is that the court was in 
error in not granting all of plaintiff's instructions num-
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bered 1 through 12. I assume this covers plaintiff's Re-
quest No. 11, but plaintiff says nothing about it in his brief, 
except to point out that Instruction No. 11 told the jury 
that the burden of proof was upon the defendant (page 30 of 
plaintiff's brief. He argues that this is correct and we agree. 
The jury was so instructed. The plaintiff did take an excep-
tion to the court's Instruction No. 6, which sets forth both 
the theory of the plaintiff and that of the defendant on the 
issue now under discussion and concluded by telling the jury 
that the burden was on the defendant to prove that the case 
had been settled and disposed of by mutual agreement be-
tween the parties (R. 24). No claim whatever is made in the 
brief that the court erred in this instruction and the reasons 
given for the exception taken at the trial are not mentioned 
or discussed by plaintiff except for plaintiff's exception to 
the court's refusal to grant his Request No. 11 (the error of 
which he does not discuss at all in the brief) . There is no 
error claimed by the defendant with relation to the issue 
now under discussion as t<?· instructions given by the court, 
instructions requested and refused and no complaint is 
made that the evidence is insufficient to warrant the ver-
dict of the jury. 
This was, of course, a proper issue to be submitted; 
as the National Railway Labor Act requires in contracts 
such as here involved, that "disputes between an employee 
or group of employees and a carrier, or carriers, growing 
out of grievances * * * shall be handled in the usual 
manner up to and including the chief operating officer of 
the carrier designated to handle such disputes." 45 USC 
S.ec. 153 (i). The same section of the Act then provides 
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that if the grievance is then not settled by mutual agree-
ment that either party may submit it to the Railroad Ad-
justment Board. The employee, of course, may sue in the 
courts as well, if an only if, agreement is not reached by 
negotiation on the property. Slocum vs. Delaware Lacka-
wana Western Ry., 339 US 239, 94 L. Ed. 795, 61 Sp. Ct. 
577. Paulsen was the chief operating officer and the case 
was settled by mutual agreement, as contemplated by the 
Railway Labor Act. The parties were following the pro-
cedure provided in the Railway Labor Act for settlement of 
the grievance, and by mutual agreement reached a settle-
ment thereof. The Railway Labor Act, designed to keep 
litigation concerning railroad labor matters from flooding 
the courts should be maintained by the courts. 
After Russell's application for reinstatement had been 
rejected by Superintendent Edens, he had the unquestioned 
right under the contract to appeal to the highest supervis-
ing officer of the company, Mr. F. C. Paulsen, who was the 
Vice President and Chief Operating and Executive Officer 
of the defendant company (Tr. 152). This final appeal he 
took, being represented by Mr. C. E. McDaniels, acting 
Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North America. 
He authorized McDaniels in writing as an officer of the 
SUN A, to prosecute and progress his grievance claim, to 
act as his agent and representative in his "place and stead" 
and authorized McDaniels to "negotiate, adjust and dispose 
of" the grievance "in any manner" ( Def. Ex. I). McDan-
iels proceeded to handle Russell's claim and after some cor-
respondence a conference was arranged in the office of Mr. 
Paulsen in Salt Lake City between Mr. Paulsen and Mr. 
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McDaniels. This conference took place May 7, 1946, Mr. 
McDaniels and Mr. Paulsen being the only ones present 
(Tr. 159). There was but the one conference (Tr. 159). 
Mr. Paulsen and Mr. McDaniels reviewed the investigation 
(Tr. 160) and Mr. Paulsen told McDaniels that Russell 
had falsified at the investigation (Tr. 161). Mr. McDan-
iels told Paulsen that if Russell falsified at the investiga-
tion "we don't condone it" (Tr. 161). McDaniels asked for 
an opportunity to investigate the charge Mr. Paulsen had 
made, stating that if the accusation was correct he would 
advise Paulsen thereof, but that he wanted "to be sure that 
I'm right" and "I'll not go along with a man that will not 
tell the truth" (Tr. 160-161-162). The conference closed 
on this note. No further conferences were held and Mr. 
Paulsen heard no more from either McDaniels, or Russell 
or anyone else on Russell's behalf, (Tr. 162) except through 
a letter dated lV[ay 14, 1946, written by Mr. McDaniels 
( Def. Ex. 13) and addressed to Mr. Paulsen. 
McDaniels in this letter referred to the conference held 
with Mr. Paulsen on May 7 and specifically to the charge 
that Russell had falsified and then said: 
"As agreed during our conference, further ac-
tion on the subject matter was to be held in abeyance 
pending our investigation of undesirable procedure 
on the part of Mr. Russell resulting in false testi-
mony evidenced during formal investigation of 
August 3, 1945. 
"This investigation has been completed and it 
is without prejudice to our contentions and position 
as expressed in our letter of February 15, 1946 and 
without establishing a precedent as to adjustment 
of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts and 
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circumstances devolving upon similar allegations as 
appear in the introduction of the formal investiga-
tion of August 3, 1945, we are withdrawing the 
griev,ance and the case is closed." 
Upon receipt of the foregoing letter from Mr. McDan-
iels, Mr. P'aulsen closed his files on the case and thereafter 
treated the matter as he testified, as a dead issue and heard 
no more thereon until Russell filed this suit for unlawful 
discharge in May of 1949, three years later (Tr. 165). Mr. 
McDaniels testified that under defendant's Exhibit I, which 
was the authorization admittedly executed by Russell, he 
had authority to dispose of the grievance in any manner 
(Tr. 201-202). His written authority (Def. Ex. I) speaks 
for itself, but this testimony shows that McDaniels knew 
I 
when he advised Paulsen that the grievance was withdrawn 
and the case closed that he was terminating the controversy 
with finality. It was claimed by plaintiff that the language 
in McDaniel's letter, viz.: "it is without prejudice to our 
contentions and position as expressed in our letter of F'eb-
ruary 15, 1946 and without establishing a precedent as to 
adjustment of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts 
and circumstances devolving upon similar allegations" was 
a statement to Mr. Paulsen that he, McDaniels, was with-
drawing as Mr. Russell's representative leaving Mr. Russell 
to negotiate further with Mr. Paulsen, and to prosecute his 
grievance and claim against the company in any way he 
saw fit. Perhaps this language may be considered to inject 
some ambiguity into the letter. In the former opinion, re-
ferring to this letter, Mr. Justice McDonough said : 
"The letter heretofore referred to from the Vice 
President of the union to the Vice President of de-
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fendant indicates that conferences were had between 
the representatives of the er.aployer and employee, 
after which the representative of the latter appar-
ently indicated that his investigation showed that 
the plaintiff had given false testimony at the hear-
ing before the Assistant Superintendent." 
Further Justice McDonuogh said: 
"It would be a travesty of justice to permit the 
plaintiff to recover in this proceeding substantial 
damages based upon an unsworn statement of the 
interested plaintiff which his duly authorized repre-
sentative evidently concluded was false." 
The italics in the foregoing quotations are ours, made to 
indicate that the court thought (and certainly with some 
justification) that McDaniel's letter closing the case was 
not wholly unequivocable. To remove all doubt on this score, 
we brought Mr. F. C. Paulsen, from Los Angeles to testify 
with respect to the conference between him and Mr. McDan-
iels, which precipitated the letter in question. \Ve thought 
if we could show vvhat transpired at that conference it 
would remove all ambiguity and any question of the mean-
ing of Mr. McDaniel's letter. We think we accomplished 
our purpose. The testimony of lVlr. Paulsen quoted above 
shows that after he told McDaniels at the conference that 
Russell had falsified at the investigation McDaniels said 
"v.re don't condone it," asked for an opportunity to investi-
gate the charge stating he '\Vould advise lVfr. Paulsen if he 
found the accusation was correct and as IVIr. Paulsen testi-
fied McDaniels said he ,,~anted "to be sure that I'm right" 
and "I'll not go along with a man that '\vill not tell the 
truth." 
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The defendant called Mr. McDaniels to testify at the 
trial. Mr. McDaniels' testim~~o the effect that 
Paulsen told him Russell ha~~ at the formal inves-
tigation ( Tr. 109) . Mr. McDaniels claimed that he with-
drew on instructions from the Grand Lodge of the Switch-
men's Union of North An1erica (Tr. 194) because Russell 
was delinquent in his dues. He did not produce this letter, 
but testified it and all other correspondence that he had 
with the Grand Lodge of the Switchmen's Union of North 
America concerning this case had been destroyed ( Tr. 197) . 
When asked the following question by Mr. Bronson: 
"Q. \Vhy do you destroy official communica-
tions of that kind concerning the business of the 
SUNA?" 
He answered : 
"Because such letters of that description, Mr. 
Counselor, establishes policy procedure on the part 
of the organization, and by reason of a certain de-
gree of intimacy between the operating railroad 
organizations we are not permitted to keep those 
letters on file whatsoever. They could possibly be 
confiscated and used as propaganda. 
"Q. In other words you destroy all your cor-
respondence in your organization? 
"A. Where they establish policy. 
"Q. That is what happened to this letter? 
"A. Exactly" ( Tr. 198) . 
With respect to the portion of the letter which plain-
tiff contends was a statement by McDaniels that he was 
'vithdrawing the grievance without prejudice to Russell, it 
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is clear that this is an after-thought and a desperate at-
tempt to avoid the true meaning and effect of the letter. 
McDaniels testified that the language "without prejudice 
etc." was more or less formal language commonly used in 
communications making final disposition of labor claims 
(Tr. 211). He was asked: 
"Q. And didn't it mean this Mr. McDaniels, 
that you say to management when you are disposing 
of a case one way or another, you say that to them, 
so that you put them on notice; that if in the future 
a case of another man comes up where the facts are 
different, different situation, that they won't point 
to this case and say 'you did thus and so; and there-
fore this thing is your precedent'? 
"A. That's right. Part of the purpose; yes 
sir." 
While he was on the stand in the trial below, his atten-
tion was called to a deposition he had given before trial 
and after the proper preliminaries (Tr. 212-213), he was 
asked if he did not make the following statements : 
"Q. I asked you this question: 
" 'Question. Now, as a matter of fact, this 
expression you used in your letter "without 
prejudice to any position you wanted to take in 
connection with the handling of future griev-
ances" is almost a formal expression which is 
used by you and other men handling grievances 
with railroad carriers so that if a case arises 
in the future the company won't refer to this 
case you have handled and call it a precedent 
and use it against you to your prejudice. Isn't 
that the reason?' 
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"Q. And your Answer : 
" 'Answer : That's correct.' " 
To which Mr. McDaniels answered at the trial: 
"A. It remains unaltered, if that is the ques-
tion" (Tr. 213). 
And, futher, (referring to the deposition) : 
" 'Question: Well, isn't that what you had in 
mind ; that you wanted to say and did say there that 
regardless of your handling of this case and the de-
cision that you made and that Paulsen made in the 
disposition of the case that you didn't want it to be 
considered as setting a precedent as to adjustment 
of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts and 
circumstances.' 
"Q. And your Answer: 
"'Answer: That's correct.' 
"Q. Did you so answer? 
"A. Yes, sir" (Tr. 215). 
It cannot be said that McDaniels was a completely dis-
interested witness. Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Patterson, is 
the regional counsel for Mr. McDaniels' organization, the 
Switchmen's Union of North America (Tr. 215). 
We think that having now proved what transpired at 
the conference, which later precipitated this critical letter 
of Mr. McDaniels, together with the evidence bearing on the 
meaning of that portion of the letter, which states in effect 
that McDaniels does not want his action to be used as a 
precedent to prejudice him in the handling of future griev-
ances where the facts are different, that we have removed 
all ambiguity as to the true meaning of the letter. It was 
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not the defendant railroad but the plaintiff, through Mc-
Daniels, who withdrew the grievance and closed the case. 
rrhe railroad of course assented. McDaniels' authority to 
thus handle and conclude the matter is undisputed and it 
was never revoked. 
We think that if there was nothing more in the case; 
that this issue, would be entirely sufficient to warrant af-
firmance of the j udgm.ent. If we concede error in the court's 
instructions and in its refusal to grant plaintiff's requested 
instructions, as well as insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's findings that Russell violated Rule 55(b) 
and was not denied his rights under Rule 38; we nonethe-
less submit that the judgment should be affirmed on this 
other issue in the case. One count sustained by sufficient 
evidence and free from error is all that is required to sup-
port a verdict. With respect to the issue as to whether or 
not the case was "settled by mutual agreement" it is our 
position that the evidence was sufficient to support a ver-
dict in defendant's favor and that there was no error in 
connection with the instructions or otherwise in submitting 
this issue to the jury. No error is assigned relative to the 
court's instruction other than plaintiff's exception to the 
court's refusal to grant his Request No. 11, which was in 
effect a request to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
on this issue an issue on which there was much conflicting 
evidence. 
In Berger vs. Southern Pacific Company, The Pull-
man Company and J. V. Z eno, ( . . . Cal. App. . .. ) 300 P. 
(2d) 170, decided, Sept. 1956, the plaintiff sought damages 
on account of an alleged assault by a pullman porter. The 
case was dismissed as against the Southern Pacific Com-
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pany and proceeded against The Pullman Company and the 
individual defendant on two counts, one based on negligence, 
the other on assault. Both issues were submitted to the 
jury, who returned a general verdict against both defen-
dants. It was thus impossible to determine whether the 
general verdict was based on the first or second counts or 
issues, or both. The Appellate Court held that there was 
no evidence whatever to support a verdict based on the 
first count. Nonetheless it held that "the erroneous sub-
mission to the jury of the first count and the giving of 
instructions therein is not prejudicial if the second count 
can be sustained." 
The court cited with approval the language in the case 
of Leoni vs. Delany, 83 Cal. App. (2d) 303, 188 P. (2d) 
765, which had this to say in considering the question we 
now urge on the court: 
"If one count is not affected by error and there 
is substantial evidence to support a verdict with 
respect to it, it is immaterial that there may have 
been errors committed in connection with another 
count or that there is not sufficient evidence to sus-
tain a verdict as to such other count. One count 
sustained by sufficient evidence and free from error 
is all that is required to support a verdict. The 
specifications of error which the appellant has made 
with reference to giving and the refusal to give cer-
tain instructions, all pertain to the first cause of 
action and are immaterial to the second count." 
There being no error and the evidence being sufficient 
to warrant the general verdict in favor of the defendant on 
this issue, we submit that this court can affirm on that 
ground alone. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
10 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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